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STUDENT NOTES
SEARCH AND SEIZUJi--POBABnLE CAUSE FOR SEARCH WAaINTr-In
order to search a house for intoxicating liquor, two affidavits were
made before a commissioner. The first stated that, "on or about Octo-
ber 14, 1931, he (affiant) went around and about the premises herein-
after described and saw persons haul cans, commonly used in handling
whiskey, and what appeared to be corn sugar up to and into the place
and saw the same car or truck haul similar cans, apparently heavily
loaded away from there and smelled odors and fumes of cooking mash
coming from the place, and he says there is a still and whiskey mash
on the premises." The second merely asserted a belief that the state-
ments in the first were true. A search warrant was immediately issued
and officers searching the prenrises seized a still and 350 gallons of
whiskey, which were offered in evidence against defendant upon his
indictment for unlawful manufacture of whiskey and possession of
property designed for the unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquors.
Defendant was convicted by the District Court of the United States for
the Eastern District of Kentucky and this was affirmed by the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals. The decision, however, was reversed
by the United States Supreme Court in an opinion handed down No-
vember 7, 1932. Held, the affidavits were insufficient to furnish probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant under the National Pro-
hibition Act; Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Cardozo dissenting.
Grau v. United States, 53 S. Ct. 38 (1932).
The above case raises the much discussed problem of what con-
stitutes probable cause sufficient for the issuance of a.search warrant.
In Dumbra v. United States, 268 U. S. 435, 441, 45 S. Ct. 546, 69 L.
Ed. 1032 (1925), the Supreme Court in defining probable cause
said, "if the apparent facts set out in the affidavit are such that
a reasonably discreet and prudent man would be led to believe that
there was a commission of the offense charged, there is probable cause
justifying the issuance of a warrant." Another definition is given in
Carl v. Ayers, 8 Sickels 14, 17 (53 N. Y. 1873). "Probable cause
is defined to be a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by cir-
cumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man in is belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged."
Probable cause is a question, much before the federal courts and
also the courts of those 19 states which follow the federal rule
that evidence obtained by the use of an invalid search warrant
cannot be used in evidence to convict a defendant. Cornelius, Search
and Seizure (2d Ed.) page 36. In those states adopting a contra view
It is naturally of less importance as the defendant is limited to an
.action against the officer making the search.
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To protect the people of this country from unreasonable search
and seizure, the 4th Amendment to the Constitution was included in
the so called "Bill of Rights." This provided, "No warant shall issue
but upon probable cause supported on oath or affirmation and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things
to be seized." The Supreme Court has decided in Barron v. Baltimore,
7 Peters 243, 8 L. Ed. 672 (1833), that this is binding only on the
federal government. Most states have provided similar protection by
constitutional provisions or statutes. Section 10 of the Constitution of
Kentucky provides, "The people shall be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable search and seizure;
and no warrant shall issue to search any place, or seize any person
or thing, without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation."
Disregarding for the moment the Internal Revenue and National
Prohibition Statutes, let us examine the affidavits in Gran v. United
States, supra, in the light of these provisions and the previously de-
cided cases.
A search warrant carries with it a presumption that it is pre-
ceded by a proper affidavit, placing the burden of proof on the one who
desires to show otherwise. When contested, however, it has been fre-
quently held that the warrant is invalid unless the affidavit stated
facts sufficient to create in the mind of the issuing officer probable
cause to believe there had been a violation of the law. Abraham v.
Commonwealth, 202 Ky. 491, 260 S. W 18 (1924). IU is not sufficient
that affiant stated he had information and reasonable cause to believe
or did believe the facts alleged. United States v. K6lih, 272 Fed. 484
(1921). The weight of authority is that an affidavit for a search war-
rant is insufficient if made on information and belief (18 R. C. L. 36),
though the opposite conclusion has also been reached. 24 R. C. L. 708.
Kentucky generally follows the former rule. It is stated however in
Goode v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 755, 252 S. W 105 (1923), that it is
not necessary that affiant state facts within his personal knowledge to
which he would be permitted to testify at the trial of the person ac-
cused, but only facts and circumstances which will enable the officer
issuing the warrant to determine whether there is probable cause. The
second affidavit, which merely asserted a belief that the statements in
the first were true, was clearly insufficient as stated by the court.
The affidavit as well as reciting facts must show a present existing
cause for search by showing that conditions are reasonably coexistent
with the issuance of the warrant, or at least use the present tense.
Ruptnskt v. United States, 4 F (2d) 17 (1925), Bentley, et al. v. Com-
monwealth, 239 Ky. 122, 38 S. W. (2d) 963 (1931). Here the first affi-
davit definitely gave the date when the information was obtained and
the warrant was issued immediately.
Are the facts stated in the affidavit sufficient to create in the mind
of the commissioner probable cause for issuing a warrant? The affi-
davit stated that affiant saw large cans commonly used in handling
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whiskey and corn sugar being brought to, and cans heavily loaded car-
ried away from the place. Also that affiant -smelled the odor of cooking
mash. Facts can only be ascertained through the senses and affiant
-could only get his knowledge through his sense of sight, hearing, smell,
taste or touch. In United States T. Kardos, 31 F. (2d) 204 (1928), an
affidavit was made to obtain a search warrant for a garage, the other
conditions being almost identical. The court found the affidavit suffi-
cient as affiant said he was familar with the odor of mash and smelled
such an odor coming from the garage. A different view was taken by
the court in United States v. A Certazn Distillery, 24 F. (2d) 557 (1928),
where it was sought to search a dwelling house. The court thought it
was practically impossible to tell by the odor whether the cooking was
for food or beverage purposes. Kentucky has upheld the so called
"smell warrant" in Abraham v. Commonwealth, supra.
The first affidavit contained the positive statements, "there is a
still and whiskey mash on the premises." The courts have usually
held that a positive statement without the facts upon which it is
based is sufficient to constitute probable cause. Sutton v. United States,
289 Fed. 488 (1923), Caudill and McLemore v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky
695, 249 S. W 1005 (1923). By a positive statement affiant assumes
responsibility and may be sued thereon, but, if he merely says that
he believes, he thereby avoids responsibility. Neal v. Commonwealth,
203 Ky. 353, 262 S. W 287 (1924).
It is submitted that in Kentucky and all other states having pro-
hibition enforcement legislation, the affidavit would have been suffi-
cient to constitute probable cause for a search warrant.
The basis of the decision in the case discussed is Section 25 of
Title 2 of the National Prohibition Act (27 U. S. C. A., sec. 39). "No
warrant shall issue to search any private dwelling occupied as such
unless it be used for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, or unless
it is in part used for some business purpose such as a store, shop,
saloon, restaurant, hotel or boarding house:' Nobridga v. United States,
22 F (2d) 507 (1927), held that the operation of a still in a house
was not a business purpose uf which the words in the statute are
illustrative. The Supreme Court in reversing followed this decision.
The lower court had decided that the-affidavit stated facts sufficient
to warrant tife belief that the dwelling was used as headquarters for
the merchandising of intoxicating liquor. The Supreme Court did
not think the affidavit furnished probable -cause to believe that actual
sales were made on the premises and said that the guarantees in the
4th Amendment must be liberally construed to 'prevent impairment
of the protection extended.
In this decision which makes it almost impossible lor a federal
officer to 'search a dwelling where he knows intoxicating liquor is
being manufactured in large quantities, has not 'the Supreme Court
gone far beyond protecting persons against 'unreasonable search and
seizure? In 'sustaining its 'position the court cited Boyd v. United
States, 116 U. S. 616, Z S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886), and Gould v.
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United States, 255 U. S. 298, 41 S. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647 (1921). It is
interesting to note in reading these eases that after saying the con-
stitutional provision should be -liberally construed, the first case drew
a distinction between the search of a man's private papers for the
purpose of convicting -him of a crime and a search for contraband
gods "which rightfully belongs to the custody of the law." The second
-ase added that the 4th Amendment permits search and seizure when
justified by the interest of the public and when the lawful exercise
,of police power renders possession of the goods sought unlawful and
provides for their seizure.
In defense of the decision, which unquestionably resulted in the
defendant escaping the penalty for breaking the law, it might be argued
that the responsibility lies with Congress and not with the court. In
the section of the National Prohibition Act above quoted, Congress
provided that the search of a -rivate dwelling might be made only
wvhere it was used for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor. If they
had intended manufacture and sale they should have so stated. The
:Florida Statute which is otherwise similar to the federal act did insert
the word manufacture. Compiled Laws of Florida 1927, Section 8518.
The writer, however, -prefers the view taken by the court in United
States v. Berger, 22 F (2d) 867 (1927), that a dwelling that is used
for the unlawful manufacture of liquor which is either sold there or is
removed from thence for sale, is subject to search. Here the statute
was interpreted to give the expression, "for the sale," a meaning equiv-
alent to "in connection with the sale," under authority of Title 2,
Section 3 of the National Prohibition Act (27 U. S. C. A., see. 12),
which provides that "all the provisions of this shall be liberally con-
strued to the end that the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may
be prevented."
There must necessarily be a lack of uniformity in decisions which
must rest on "what a reasonably discrete and prudent man" 'would
think. Many border line cases will depend on the attitude of the judge
or judicial officer. Just how much weight will be given to general sus-
picion, hearsay, reputation of the defendant and judicial notice .of the
character of the neighborhood where the property to be searched 'is
located, will vary with the judge for "judges are human."
1). L. THORNTOn.
AGLENcy-THu F.AmiLr PuwosE DoornR i--In the recent case of
Steele v. Age's Admr, 223 Ry. 714, 26 S. W 2d) 563 (1930), a minor
son, driving with his lathir's consent, had a collision in the family
automobile. The boy was driving recklessly at the time, and the
iac'hine was precipitated onto tfle sidewalk, where it struck and
killed the -plaintiff's intestate. The father, who maintained the auto-
mobile for the general use and convenience of the family, 'Was held
liable. The court based its decision on 'the "family purpose doctrine,"
which has been adoptea in Kentucky. ,Stowe v. Mrs, 147 'Ky. 386,
144S. W '52 (1912); Willerv. Wect, 1'6 Ky. 552, '21q S. W ;904 1920),
